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Abstract 
 International political economy deals with mutual interaction of 
international politics and international economics. The ever-changing political 
scenarios, be it right-wing or left-wing, agriculture in particular has been 
neglected. The main focus of the paper is to study the effects of political 
economy on agriculture, farmers, consumer welfare and economic growth. 
The data on indicators collected from FAO, World Bank, IMF, UNDES, WEF, 
OECD, CGIAR reports. The growth rates, Agricultural Orientation Index 
(AOI) and statistical-analysis estimated. Globally, political and economic 
systems, international governments like World Bank, IMF and WTO’s attitude 
towards agriculture is poor. Agriculture must be brought on global political 
agenda for sustainable food security, economic growth and development and 
to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s). The protection of 
producers and consumers is being based on political will of governments. The 
study concludes for developing countries, stimulus package is required for the 
development of agriculture. The political economy of AOI indicates that the 
countries which have more than 1 will spend more budget in budget allocation 
towards agriculture. The study found that, clearly agriculture globally is not 
on the priority list for the local central governments in allocating their budgets 
towards agriculture. The study suggests that, economic minded politicians and 
political minded economists who has knowledge of social, political and 
economic systems are required in efficient economic system of agriculture. 
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Introduction: 
 International politicians tend to neglect economic dimensions while 
dealing with international relationships and international economists tend to 
neglect political dimensions in dealing with international economy.  Benefit-
cost analysis is a tool devised by economists. Economists think in terms of 
opportunity costs and incentives; lawyers think in terms of rules and penalties 
and of defeating their adversary (Schultze, 1977; Rhoads, 1985). Politicians 
determine the optimal policy by maximizing their own utility which is of 
political contribution called growth or social welfare and votes. They also 
focus on political economics of fiscal policy, macro economy and the role of 
constitution. The role of government in agriculture in agricultural marketplace 
each year is in each step from the farm to the market, there is a framework of 
national, state, and local government policies. Government may influence 
what a farmer grows, where a farm is located, how products are transported 
and processed, how a commodity is traded, and the price the farmer might 
receive (Iowa Public Television, 2017). 
 International political economy studies problems that arise from or are 
affected by the interaction of international politics, international economics, 
and different social systems (e.g., capitalism and socialism) and societal 
groups (e.g., farmers at the local level, immigrants in a region, the poor who 
exist transnationally in all countries) (Encyclopedia Britanica, 2017). Models 
need to incorporate sufficiently complex interactions between ideology, 
economic structure, and protection to understand better how this web of 
interactions affects agricultural and food policies. Consider, for example, food 
policies of the most extreme left-wing regimes. Communist dictators such as 
Stalin in Russia, Mao in China, and Hoxha in Albania all heavily taxed 
agriculture, while farmers were subsidized under the Communist regimes of 
Brezhnev in the Soviet Union and in most East European Communist 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2010). 
 The political institution variables require further improvement. For 
example, Swinnen, Banerjee, and de Gorter (2001) find how some of the 
changes in voting rules in Belgium had effects on agricultural protection, 
while others had no effect. In particular, those changes in electoral rules which 
disproportionately benefited people involved in agriculture (such as extending 
voting rights to small farmers and tenants in the early twentieth century) 
induced an increase in agricultural protection, while electoral changes (such 
as extending voting rights to women) did not affect agricultural protection. 
Rather, they increased voting rights both of those in favor of and of those 
against protection. 
 An area where substantial improvements could be made is in analyzing 
the impact of international organizations and international trade agreements 
on agricultural policy distortions. While this issue has received considerable 
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attention over the past decade, for example, the URAA effects, the 
establishment of the WTO, NAFTA, EU enlargement, etc., there has been little 
econometric work on this issue. It seems to agree that while the URAA may 
have constrained the growth of agricultural protection, it has done little to 
reduce it, at least in the countries that were members of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the trade negotiations (Anania et al. 
2004). Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and Dutt and Mitra (2007) derive 
hypotheses that countries with a comparative advantage in agriculture who 
join the WTO will exhibit a larger fall in agricultural protection levels.  
 Many (agricultural) political econometric models effectively focus on 
producers (farmers), consumers and taxpayers. Some recent models have tried 
to include politicians’ preferences by including an “ideology” variable. 
However, this needs to be improved in order to correctly measure influences. 
Similarly, the role of other bureaucratic organizations, such as the European 
Commission, is mostly not captured, although they may play an important role 
(Prendergast,2007). Political entrepreneurs may also play a role in organizing 
interest groups and making their preferences more influential. For example, 
politicians played a key role in organizing farmers in rural Europe in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they tried to set up farm 
organizations that were closely associated with certain political parties. More 
recently, some (politically “savvy”) African leaders have been using (rural) 
interests either to ensure their political survival, such as Mugabe in Zimbabwe, 
or their rise to power, such as in the post-Mao political struggle in China when 
the reformers around Deng Xiaoping took over control of the Communist 
Party, aided by the success of the property rights reforms (Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2009).  
 The financial (institutional/political) crises affecting the global setting, 
for example, the financial crises in Latin America in the 1980s and in Asia in 
the 1990s, the liberalization reforms after the political changes in the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s, and the structural adjustment programs in Africa in the 
1980/90s. With regard to political institutions, while the importance of 
political systems for policy, and thus agricultural policy distortions, has long 
been emphasized, for example as in the seminal work by Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), the past decade and a half has witnessed a growing set of 
studies that analyze the impact of political regimes and ideology on policy-
making. Persson and Tabellini (2002; 2003) analyzed the relationship between 
electoral systems and economic policy. To relate some of these more general 
insights to agricultural policy-making, consider the political regime, the 
“constitutional choice,” in the framework of providing the degree of 
“insulation” afforded to policy-makers (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004).  
 Several empirical studies do find an impact of political institutions on 
trade and agricultural policy. For example, Banerji and Ghanem (1997) and 
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Milner and Kubota (2005) find that authoritarian regimes do have higher trade 
protection and greater labor market distortions. In a related approach, Masters 
and McMillan (2000) and McMillan (2001) find that governments that have a 
lower discount rate (that is, those that are less likely to lose power in the future, 
which presumably includes more autocratic regimes) are less likely to tax 
agricultural exports in Africa. Olper and Raimondi (2009) find that, within 
democratic regimes, agriculture is significantly more protected under 
proportional electoral rule than under majoritarian. However, they do not find 
a difference between presidential and parliamentary electoral systems 
ideology. An interesting approach to disentangling some of the problems 
regarding the interactions between political institutions and preferences of 
autocratic rules is proposed by Dutt and Mitra (2005). These authors focus on 
the impact of ideology and allow the ideology variable to interact with an 
indicator of the structure of the economy, that is, its resource endowment, as 
well as an indicator for political liberties, to measure the conditional impact of 
ideology. Interestingly, they find that the more left-wing a government is, that 
is, it attaches higher weight to the welfare of workers/labor, the more 
protectionist it is in the case of capital-abundant countries, but the less 
protectionist it is in the case of capital-scare countries.  
 Swinnen (forthcoming 2009), who finds that right-wing governments 
in Europe, such as those dominated by Catholic parties and conservative 
parties, as well as the Nazi party in Germany (1933–1945), have tended to 
support farm interests and increase protection. Swinnen and Anderson (2010) 
gives, a review of the most dramatic changes in agricultural policy distortions 
that have occurred in recent decades reveals that these have been triggered by 
“external changes.” For example, it is well known that budgetary problems 
played an important role in stimulating agricultural policy liberalization in 
Sweden and New Zealand in the 1980s. Similarly, regime changes in China, 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union triggered important changes in 
their agricultural policies. In fact, one could even argue that the objective of 
these governments was not to change agricultural policy per se, but that overall 
changes implied a change in agricultural policy as well. Blanchard and 
Willmann (2007) show, with a dynamic political economy model, that in a 
democracy there may be two steady states: one protectionist and one liberal.  
 Global agriculture needs a ‘profound transformation’ to fight climate 
change and protect food security, hunger, poverty. In response to this 
challenge, the New Vision for Agriculture calls for a new approach. The new 
approach is global leaders have aligned around the New Vision for 
Agriculture. Regional and national leaders have adopted the vision as their 
own, catalysing action-oriented partnerships in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. (Dastagiri, 2017). Agriculture in the 21st century has multiple 
challenges. In the recent political international developments, globally, 
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agriculture seems is back on the development agenda, seen as a key to spurring 
growth and reducing poverty, and as a key route to meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals  (FAO, 2012). Experts and the public alike seem to 
alternate between pessimism and optimism, anxiety and complacency, about 
the world food situation and outlook. For the past few decades, the rate of 
growth in world food production in both developed and developing countries 
has exceeded the population growth rate. During the 1970s and 1980s the food 
situation improved tremendously (Mrityunjay and Singh, 2008). But by the 
1980s and 1990s the increasing scarcity of land and water resources, 
environmental degradation, and loss of biodiversity had begun to limit the 
expansion of food production in both developed and developing countries 
(Dastagiri, 1998). 
 World Watch Institute (2004) reports that increases in food 
production, per hectare of land, have not kept pace with increases in 
population, and the planet has virtually no more arable land or fresh water to 
spare. FAO (2011) emphasizes agricultural investment is essential to 
promoting agricultural growth, reducing poverty and hunger, and promoting 
environmental sustainability. Reports on global food security in 2011 by the 
IFPRI (2011) and other reports of the FAO (2012), the World Bank (2011), 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (2011) all 
highlighted the need for governments to ensure responsible investment in 
agriculture. Global food security – or, in more traditional terminology, world 
hunger– remains a serious concern (Valentin, 2011). However, even at the 
global level, current food supplies are sufficient to nourish the world 
population (Valentin, 2011). Food insecurity, therefore, results from uneven 
distribution. In the coming decades, calorific production is projected to further 
outpace population growth (Valentin, 2011). Global food crises are turning 
out to be far too frequent to be dismissed any longer as a freakish 
phenomenon. A spike in the prices of agricultural commodities is again 
looming, threatening a repetition of the 2007-2008 global food crisis when 
international prices skyrocketed to their highest in 30 years (Caliber, 2012). 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s food price index rose by 
over 80 per cent between the start of 2007 and mid-2008 (Subramaniam, 
2012). Severe drought in the United States, flooding in several parts of 
Europe, a massive shortfall of rain in Africa and India are feared to lead to 
huge loss of output and a scramble for markets and supplies (Subramaniam, 
2012). As in many other parts of the world, soaring food prices during the 
period 2007/08 had major impacts on the countries of Southeast Asia. It is 
hardly surprising that the use of cost-benefit analysis, quantitative risk 
assessment, and similar analytic tools generates substantial political 
controversy in the United States. The risks, costs, and benefits under scrutiny 
are usually difficult to estimate with precision. (Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978). 
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Human beings in general and elected officials in particular find it difficult to 
admit that the policies they support leave some innocent people at risk, 
especially when that risk is potentially lethal (R. Shep Melnick) 
 Most regulatory agencies are internally diverse, numbering economists 
and political executives, as well as lawyers, engineers, and scientists, among 
their staffs. Political executives must take responsibility for the consequences 
of agency decisions—economic as well as environmental. Agency economists 
spend a good deal of their time estimating the economic consequences of 
regulatory decisions and responding to arguments put forth by economists 
outside the agency.  
 In the face of climate change, global political and food insecurity, and 
volatility of global market prices and the resurgence of health crises, only an 
ambitious, continent –wide policy can safeguard each country’s 
independence. The main focus of the paper is devoted to explaining the 
incentives and strategies of politicians, economists, agency officials, and 
environmental advocates. How this web of interactions affects agricultural 
and food policies, farmers, consumers, welfare and economic growth?  
 The specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To study the effects, benefits and costs of political economy of 
countries in budget allocation in sectors. 
2. To analyse the political economy of countries in preferences of 
agriculture and other sectors. 
3. To analyse the political economy of the impact of international 
organizations (WTO, WB, IMF) and international trade agreements on 
agriculture.  
4. To analyse the political economy motives behind preferring farmer and 
consumer welfare. 
5. To suggest policies and strategies to adopt the successful political 
economy of agriculture in the globe. 
 
Data and Methodology 
          The study is basically based on political economy of global agriculture 
and quantitative frame work. The effects of global political economy of 
agriculture in general and continents & country-wise in particular from 37 to 
170 major countries of 6 continents policies and insights were analyzed. The 
developed countries of continents viz., European union (15 countries), North 
America (3 countries viz., USA, Mexico and Canada), Asia (11 countries 
including china), South America (4 countries), Africa (2 country), and 
Australia were purposefully selected to analyze the effects of international 
political economy on global agriculture, trade, farmer and consumers, policy 
distortions, welfare and economic growth. 
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          The data and information on global economic systems, key economic 
indicators, share of sectors, GDP, World Bank lending sector wise, global 
agricultural domestic support during WTO regime, producer and consumer 
support and policies collected from FAO, World Bank, IMF, UNDES, WEF, 
OECD, CGIAR reports and published secondary sources and websites. The 
secondary data related to Producer Support Estimates and Consumer Support 
Estimates were collected from OECD Agriculture statistics (database)and 
growth rates were estimated. Continent-wide policy can safeguard each 
country’s independence. The continent wise policies are critically appraised 
and compared with one another and best policies are arrived. The study used 
Delphi survey method to validate the results obtained through secondary data 
(Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). It also suggests the best future global agricultural 
policies. The meta analysis, growth rates and agricultural orientation index 
were estimated. 
Growth rate formulae: (Damodar N. Gujarati and Sangeetha, 2007) 
The compound growth rate (r) will be calculated by fitting  
Exponential function to the variables of interest viz., allocation of funds, 
Producer Support Estimates and Consumer Support Estimates for the period 
1995 to 2018. 
Yt - Y0 (1+r)t ---------1 
Assuming multiplicative error term in the equation1, model may be linearized 
by logarithmic transformation 
lnYt = A+ Bt +€ ----------2 
Where, A (=lnAo) and B (=ln (1+r)) are the parameters to be estimated by 
ordinary least square regression, t= time trend in year, r = exp (B) -1 
Agricultural Orientation Index Formula: 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Type of political economic systems: 
 The list of countries and their type of economy shown in the table 1. It 
was found that most of the developed countries are capitalistic and developing 
countries are socialistic. Only few countries which are communist countries 
includes China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. Majority of the 
countries in the world are mixed economies in operation. These type of 
economies play an important role in resource allocation and protection of 
agriculture. 
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Table1. List of countries with their type of Economy: 
Sl.no Type of Economy Countries 
1 Capitalism  New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, United Arab 
Emirate, Taiwan, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the 
United States, Denmark, Sweden, South Korea, Thailand, 
Japan, Mexico, Germany, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Italy, 
France, Austria, South Africa and Norway. 
2 Socialism India. 
3 Communism  China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. 
4 Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Poland, 
Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Brazil. 
Refer Appendix I 
 
Economic indicators of major countries of world 
 The key economic indicators of major countries of world are shown in 
Table 2. The moving average of real world GDP percentage decreasing from 
3.3 in 2014 to 2.9 in 2016. The European countries and Japan show an 
increasing trend, however, the United States, the OECD and Non-OECD 
countries, Indonesia and Russia display a mixed trend in the real GDP 
percentage over the years 2014, 2015 and 2016. In synchronous with the world 
trend, the countries such as Brazil, China, Colombia and South Africa show a 
decreasing trend. Unemployment rate and World Trade growth rate over the 
years are decreasing, where as inflation displays a mixed trend. The developed 
countries real GDP (%) display either an increasing or a mixed trend and 
developing countries show a decreasing trend. The decreasing trend of 
developing countries real GDP (%) will not enable them to allocate more on 
agriculture. 
Table 2. Key economic indicators of major countries of world 
OECD area, unless noted otherwise 
  Average 2014 2015 2016 
2004-2013 
  Per cent 
Real GDP growth1         
World2 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.9 
OECD2 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.7 
United States 1.6 2.4 2.6 1.5 
Euro area 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.7 
Japan 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.8 
Non-OECD2 6.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 
Brazil 4.0 0.1 -3.9 -3.4 
China 10.3 7.3 6.9 6.7 
Colombia 4.8 4.4 3.1 2.1 
Indonesia 5.7 5.0 4.8 5.0 
Russia 4.1 0.7 -3.7 -0.8 
South Africa 3.3 1.6 1.3 0.4 
Output gap3 -0.5 -2.1 -1.5 -1.4 
Unemployment rate4 7.1 7.4 6.8 6.3 
Inflation5 2.0 1.6 0.7 1.0 
World real trade growth 5.3 3.9 2.6 1.9 
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1. Year-on-year increase; last three columns show the increase over a year 
earlier. 
2. Moving nominal GDP weights, using purchasing power parities. 
3. Per cent of potential GDP. 
4. Per cent of labour force. 
5. Private consumption deflator. Year-on-year increase; last 3 columns show 
the increase over a year earlier. 
Source: OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, Vol. 2016/2, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. Last updated November 2016. 
 
Comparison of Nominal GDP’s of countries in the World 
 The Country groups by nominal GDP in the world shown in table 3. 
All the 7 major advanced economies of G7 have at least 0.5% of Global GDP. 
Among the other 32 advanced economies excluding G7, countries such 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Taiwan have at least 0.5% of Global GDP. In case 
of 30 Emerging and Developing Asian economies, only 4 countries (China, 
India, Indonesia and Thailand) have at least 0.5% of Global GDP. In the 32 
Latin American and the Caribbean Countries only Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico have at least 0.5% of Global GDP. Among the Middle Eastern 
countries, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran are major economies with at least 0.5% of Global GDP. In 12 emerging 
and developing European countries, Poland and Turkey and in 12 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia, Russia have at least 0.5% 
of Global GDP. And in 45 Sub-Saharan African Countries only Nigeria has at 
least 0.5% of Global GDP. It shows that Africa is the highest backward 
continent in the world. Those countries which have less than 0.5% of Global 
GDP has a disadvantage in budget allocation to agriculture. 
Table 3. Country groups by GDP (nominal) in the World in Millions US$ as on April 2017 
Country Group GDP 
(Nominal) 
Peak 
Year 
Number 
of 
Countrie
s 
Economies with at least 0.5% of 
Global GDP 
Major advanced 
economies (G7) 
3,60,06,539 2017 7  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom, United States 
Emerging and 
Developing Asia 
1,70,84,823 2017 30  China, India, Indonesia, Thailand 
Other Advanced 
Economies 
(Advanced economies 
excluding G7) 
1,15,93,086 2014 32  Australia, Austria, Belgium, South 
Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
59,83,936 2013 32  Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
Middle East, North 
Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 
34,73,402 2014 22  Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates  
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Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
and Georgia 
29,43,338 2013 12  Russia 
Emerging and 
developing Europe 
20,31,117 2014 12  Poland, Turkey 
Sub-Saharan Africa 16,90,338 2014 45  Nigeria 
World 7,85,19,556 2014 192 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017 
 
The share of sectors in total GDP of countries 
 The share of sectors in total GDP of countries and population continent 
wise is presented in Table 4. The below 36 countries are the major economies 
of the world in GDP contribution. In agriculture sector, Nigeria has the 
maximum (17.8%) share of GDP among the world countries despite 2.5% 
share of world population. It is followed by India, which has 17.2 % share of 
GDP to the agriculture sector with 17.7% of the World Populace. The industry 
share of GDP is maximum in the Saudi Arabia at 69.1%, followed by the UAE 
(53.9%), Indonesia (47.2%), China (46.8%) and others. The services share of 
GDP is highest in the USA (79.6%), followed by France (79.4%), Greece 
(78.9%) and others. The high income economies, as classified by the World 
Bank such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Spain, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Poland, United Kingdom, France, Austria, 
Norway, Denmark, Greece, the USA and Canada have more than 50% share 
of service sector in total GDP of the respective countries. And the economies 
of the US and France have almost service sector share of nearly 80%. Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE despite being high- income countries show a low service 
sector share (28.9%, 45.3% respectively) and high industry sector share 
(69.1%, 53.9% respectively), which could be probably attributed to the Oil 
and petroleum industries. The UK (0.7%), Belgium (0.7%), Germany (0.8%) 
and the UAE (0.8%) have the least share of agriculture sector contribution to 
their GDP’s among the major world economies. China with its highest 
populace in the world seems to balance between its industry (46.8%) and 
service (43.1%) sectors contribution to their economic GDP. 
 The agriculture shares in GDP for the developing countries, as per the 
IMF, such as Nigeria, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Thailand and Argentina 
have more than 10%. Whereas, South Africa, Russia, Turkey, Mexico, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil have less than 10% share of agriculture in its 
GDP, despite being developing countries. While, in the case of South Africa 
(2.5%), it is the low availability of arable land contributing to the lowest share 
of agriculture in its GDP.  Rapid urbanization in Colombia during the 20th 
century has reflected a drop in the agriculture sectors share with increase in 
industry and services share in GDP. The study found that high dependence on 
agriculture is observed in most of the developing countries and the high 
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income economies are focusing more on (>50%) service sector. Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE has high industry sector share (>50%) which is due to their 
exploration of oil and petroleum reserves. The more dependence on 
agriculture will allow the politicians to exploit in the elections.  
Table 4. The share of sectors in total GDP of countries and population Continent wise  
No. Country/Economy Agriculture Industry Services Population % Share in 
world population 
–   World 6.1 31.1 62.9 7,46,69,64,280   
AFRICA 
1  Nigeria 17.8 25.7 54.6 18,59,89,640 2.5 
2  South Africa 2.5 31.6 65.9 5,60,15,473 0.8  
ASIA 
1  China 10.1 46.8 43.1 1,40,35,00,365 18.8 
2  Japan 1.2 27.3 71.6 12,77,48,513 1.7 
3  India 17.2 26.4 56.4 1,32,41,71,354 17.7 
4  Indonesia 14.7 47.2 38.1 26,11,15,456 3.5 
5  United Arab Emirates 0.8 53.9 45.3 92,69,612 0.1 
6  Iran 10.4 37.7 51.8 8,02,77,428 1.1 
7  Saudi Arabia 2 69.1 28.9 3,22,75,687 0.4 
8  South Korea 2.6 39.2 58.2 5,07,91,919 0.7 
9  Thailand 13.3 34 52.7 6,88,63,514 0.9 
10  Taiwan 1.3 32 66.9 2,35,56,706 0.3 
11  Turkey 9.3 28.1 62.6 7,95,12,426 1.1  
AUSTRALASIAN 
1  Australia 3.6 28.2 68.2 2,41,25,848 0.3  
EUROPE 
1  Germany 0.8 28.6 70.6 8,19,14,672 1.1 
2  Netherlands 2.7 24.2 73.1 1,69,87,330 0.2 
3  Russia 4.5 36.9 58.6 14,39,64,513 1.9 
4   Switzerland 1.3 27.5 71.3 84,01,739 0.1 
5  Spain 3.2 25.8 71 4,63,47,576 0.6 
6  Italy 2 24.7 73.4 5,94,29,938 0.8 
7  Sweden 1.8 27.3 70.9 98,37,533 0.1 
8  Belgium 0.7 21.7 77.6 1,13,58,379 0.2 
9  Poland 3.4 33.6 63 3,82,24,410 0.5 
10  United Kingdom 0.7 21.4 77.8 6,57,88,574 0.9 
11  France 1.8 18.8 79.4 6,47,20,690 0.9 
12  Austria 1.5 29.4 69.1 87,12,137 0.1 
13  Norway 2.6 39.7 57.7 52,54,694 0.1 
14  Denmark 4.5 19.1 76.4 57,11,870 0.1 
15  Greece 3.3 17.9 78.9 1,11,83,716 0.1  
NORTH AMERICA  
1  United States 1.2 19.2 79.6 32,21,79,605 4.3 
2  Canada 1.9 27.1 71 3,62,89,822 0.5 
3  Mexico 3.8 34.2 62 12,75,40,423 1.7  
SOUTH AMERICA 
1  Colombia 7 37.6 55.5 4,86,53,419 0.7 
2  Argentina 11.4 30.2 58.4 4,38,47,430 0.6 
3  Venezuela 3.8 35.8 60.4 3,15,68,179 0.4 
4  Brazil 5.5 27.5 67 20,76,52,865 2.8 
Source: Population - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section. June 2017  
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The nominal GDP and agriculture orientation index of the countries: 
 Any country’s budget allocation determines the political economy of 
sectors. The nominal GDP of the major 36 countries, the total outlays of the 
central governments and the agriculture orientation index is given in Table 5. 
As per the FAO, The Agriculture Orientation Index (AOI) for government 
expenditures is defined as the Agriculture Share of Government Expenditures, 
divided by the Agriculture Share of GDP, where agriculture refers to the 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting sector. Agriculture Orientation Index 
indicates political cost and political benefits. An Agriculture Orientation Index 
(AOI) greater than 1 reflects a higher orientation towards the agriculture 
sector, which receives a higher share of government spending relative to its 
contribution to economic value-added. An AOI less than 1 reflects a lower 
orientation to agriculture, while an AOI equal to 1 reflects neutrality in a 
government’s orientation to the agriculture sector.  
 The political economy of AOI indicates that the countries which have 
more than 1 will spend more budget in budget allocation towards agriculture. 
The study found that, clearly agriculture globally is not on the priority list for 
the local central governments in allocating their budgets towards agriculture, 
except for South Korea and Switzerland, whose agriculture orientation index 
is greater than 1(1.96 and 5.08 respectively). 
Table 5. Nominal GDP sector composition 2015 (in percentage and in millions of dollars) 
№ 
Country/Ec
onomy 
Nominal GDP (in 
Million $) 
Agri. Share in 
GDP (%) 
Total 
outlays 
2015  
(Central 
Governme
nt)         (in 
Million $) 
Agriculture 
orientation index 
 
–   World 7,52,12,696 5.90%    
 AFRICA      
1  Nigeria 4,15,080 17.80%    
2  South Africa 3,41,216 2.50% 60254.34 0.68845  
 ASIA      
1  China 1,12,18,281 6.90% 410151.69 0.31944  
2  Japan 47,30,300 1.20% 760577.81   
3  India 22,50,990 17.40%  0.000769  
4  Indonesia 9,40,953 14.30% 134821.07   
5 
 United Arab 
Emirates 
4,16,444 0.70% 17506.14 0.05023  
6  Iran 4,12,340 11.20%    
7 
 Saudi 
Arabia 
6,57,785 2%    
8  South Korea 14,04,380 2.70% 297256.6 1.96439  
9  Thailand 3,90,592 13.30% 75187.49 0.83418  
10  Taiwan 5,19,149 1.30%    
11  Turkey 7,55,716 8.90% 277290.12 0.39941  
 AUSTRALASIAN  
1  Australia 12,56,640 4% 326570.64 0.23684  
 EUROPE      
1  Germany 34,94,900 0.80% 425433.58   
2  Netherlands 7,69,930 2.80% 310458.85 0.22548  
3  Russia 12,67,750 3.90% 451002.73 0.17643  
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4   Switzerland 6,62,483 1.30% 117416.31 5.08178  
5  Spain 12,52,160 3.30% 418114.85 0.08045  
6  Italy 18,52,500 2% 537402.74 0.16724  
7  Sweden 5,17,440 1.80% 147381.2 0.38457  
8  Belgium 4,70,179 0.70% 125407.29 0.00004  
9  Poland 4,67,350 3.40% 188586.55 0.38103  
10 
 United 
Kingdom 
26,49,890 0.70% 1124398.57 0.45754  
11  France 24,88,280 1.90% 1115984.03 0.2045  
12  Austria 3,87,299 1.50% 177453.82   
13  Norway 3,76,268 2.70% 150895.81 0.93762  
14  Denmark 3,47,196 4.50% 124401.99 0.39976  
15  Greece 2,46,397 3.30% 105728.45 0.11949  
 NORTH AMERICA   
1 
 United 
States 
1,79,46,996 1.12% 2405200   
2  Canada 15,32,340 1.80%    
3  Mexico 10,63,610 3.70%    
 SOUTH AMERICA  
1  Colombia 4,00,117 8.90% 66126.09   
2  Argentina 5,41,784 10% 165216.11 0.09439  
3  Venezuela 2,09,226 4.70%    
4  Brazil 17,69,600 5.40% 496545.66 0.14801  
Sources: The World Bank _ Agri. Share % GDP 
  Share of different sectors - "The World Fact book - Central Intelligence Agency". 
Central Intelligence Agency. September 2017. 
              Total Outlays, Agriculture Orientation Index _ FAO STAT 
 
Political Economy of International Financial Institutions 
 The World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of funding 
and knowledge for developing countries, consisting of five institutions with a 
common commitment to reducing poverty, increasing shared prosperity, and 
promoting sustainable development. The World Bank Group consists, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Development Association (IDA), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The 
institutions IBRD and IDA play a major role in the agriculture sector in 
middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries of the world. 
 World Bank lending by sector wise for the fiscal years 2011 – 2015 is 
given in Table 6. World Bank lending has been the highest to Public 
administration, law and justice sector in all the years and the least to 
information and communications. Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry has been 
given low to medium preference among various sectors by the major lending 
institutions of the world. Political economy of international financial 
institutions displays high priority to Public administration, law and justice 
sectors and a poor treatment towards the agriculture sector  
 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal February 2018 edition Vol.14, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
206 
Table 6. World Bank lending sector wise: fiscal 2011–15 (Millions of dollars) 
SECTOR FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 
Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 2,128 3,134 2,112 3,059 3,027 
Education 1,733 2,959 2,731 3,457 3,534 
Energy and Mining 5,807 5,000 3,280 6,689 4,510 
Finance 897 1,764 2,055 1,984 4,054 
Health and Other Social Services 6,707 4,190 4,363 3,353 6,647 
Industry and Trade 2,167 1,352 1,432 1,807 2,311 
Information and Communications 640 158 228 381 322 
Public Administration, Law and Justice 9,673 8,728 7,991 8,837 8,180 
Transportation 8,683 4,445 5,135 6,946 5,151 
Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection 4,617 3,605 2,220 4,332 4,760 
Sector Total 43,006 35,335 31,547 40,843 42,495 
 Of which IBRD 26,737 20,582 15,249 18,604 23,528 
 Of which IDA 16,269 14,753 16,298 22,239 18,966 
Note: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding 
Source: World Bank Annual Report 2015 
 
 The active portfolio net commitments for the major regions of the 
world given in Table 7 for the year 2015. IDA being a developmental agency 
working for the poorest countries offers maximum support to African regions, 
followed by South Asia and others. IBRD focuses more on the low and middle 
income countries with its major support in Latin American and the Caribbean, 
Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific. The study observed that 
Middle East and North African Countries are funded extremely low in 
comparison to other regions of the world by IDA and IBRD. This could be due 
to the political instability and terrorism, which hinders the growth of the 
regions. 
 
Table 7. Active portfolio net commitments (Billions of dollars, as of June 30, 2015) 
Source: World Bank Annual Report 2015 
 
 The allocation of funds to various countries by the World Banks for 
the years 2014-2018 is given in Table 8. The growth rates from 2014 to 2018 
have been calculated accordingly. The growth rates for the countries China, 
Indonesia and Colombia are positive at 14.44%, 16.08% and 24.54% 
respectively. The negative growth rates are observed for Nigeria (-9.26%), 
India (-23.22%), Mexico (-4.02%) and Brazil (-66.89%). There is a sudden 
REGION IBRD IDA TOTAL 
Africa 5.1 46.9 52.0 
East Asia and Pacific 22.6 9.0 31.6 
Europe and Central Asia 23.8 2.4 26.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 25.0 2.0 27.0 
Middle East and North Africa 10.6 1.1 11.7 
South Asia 15.4 28.0 43.5 
Total 102.5 89.5 191.9 
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surge of funds in 2015 to Argentina and the growth rate since 2014 is 829.33%. 
The first democratic elections in Argentina at the end of 2015 led to a 
significant change in the economic policies of the country coupled with the 
new administrations speedy implementations of the core reforms. The study 
observed the sudden increase of funds to Argentina and decreased funding for 
the countries Nigeria, India, Mexico and Brazil. 
Table 8. Allocation of Funds to various countries by the World Banks for the year 2014-18 
№ Country/Economy 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Growth 
rate 
from 
2014-
2018 
(%) 
 AFRICA 
1  Nigeria 2022.6 1475 1075 1511  -9.26 
2  South Africa    93   
 ASIA 
1  China 1648.2 1855.6 1994.5 2470.1 402.7 14.44 
2  Japan -  
3  India 5109.4 3820.1 3844.5 2312.5 844.1 -23.22 
4  Indonesia 1085.5 1000 1700 1697.8 300 16.08 
5 
 United Arab Emirates, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Turkey 
-  
 AUSTRALASIAN (All countries) -  
 EUROPE (All countries)  -  
 NORTH AMERICA 
1  United States, Canada -  
2  Mexico 395.9 866.9 500 350  -4.02 
 SOUTH AMERICA  
1  Colombia 873.3 1410.4 1400 1686.7 512 24.54 
2  Argentina 1.9 1343.1 1000 1525  829.33 
3  Venezuela -  
4  Brazil 2019.7 568.2 758 73.3 50 -66.89 
Source: World Bank Open Data 
 
Political Economy of International Trade Institutions 
 Of late, globally, during WTO regime international political economy 
play greater role in agriculture protection and policy distortions. The 
international trade in the hands of politicians in terms of duties, QR’s and 
export import subsidies, policy economists play minimum role in these areas. 
Trade lobby often government choice of policy.  Political organization 
schemes influence lobby. Larger firm better lobbying power. 
 
Political Institutions: WTO 
 The numerical targets for agriculture during the Uruguay Round are 
given in Table 9. The average cut for all agricultural products for the 
developed countries up to 6 years is at -36% and for developing countries it is 
given at -24% up to 10 years. Whereas, the Total Aggregate Measure Support 
cut for agriculture is kept at -20% for the developed countries up to 6 years 
and for developing countries it is given at -13% up to 10 years. These targets 
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are not followed in many WTO member countries which have comparative 
advantage. 
Table 9: Numerical targets for agriculture During Uruguay Round 
Target Variables 
Developed Countries 
6 years: 1995 to 2000 
Developing Countries 
10 years:1995 to 2004 
Tariffs 
Average cut for all agricultural products -36 % -24 % 
Minimum cut per products -15 % -10 % 
Domestic Support 
Total AMS cut for sector 
 (base period:1986-88) 
-20 % -13 % 
Exports 
Value of Subsidies -36 % -24 % 
Subsidized quantities (base period 1986-90) -21 % -14 % 
Source: Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers, WTO Website, Accessed on 5th September, 
2017 
 
Global Agricultural Domestic Support 
 Agricultural support is defined as the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers to agriculture from consumers and taxpayers arising from 
government policies that support agriculture, regardless of their objectives and 
economic impacts (OECD, 2017). The compound annual growth rates of 
global agricultural supports (2000-2016) were presents in Table 10. During 
2000-2016, the highest and positive growth rates in agricultural support were 
observed in Russia (22.68 %) followed by India (20.19 %), China (19.93 %), 
New Zealand (12.34 %), Philippines (6.41 %), Costa Rica (6.36 %) and Brazil 
(6.01). During the same period, the negative growth rates in agricultural 
support were observed in Mexico (-3.44 %), Chile (-2.59 %), USA (-2.47 %), 
Japan (-1.52 %) and OECD (-0.37 %) members. The study found that during 
the period 2000 to 2016, Russia, India, China and New Zealand are given more 
domestic support and Mexico, Chile, USA, Japan and OECD countries were 
given decreasing support to agricultural sector than compared to other WTO 
member countries.  
Table 10: CAGR of Agricultural Domestic Support of Major Countries (2000-01 to 2015-
16) 
Country 
2001-01 (Million US 
$) 
2015-16 (Million US 
$) Growth Rates (%) 
AFRICA 
   Nigeria - - - 
   South Africa - - - 
ASIA 
Japan 54087.760289 41666.362575 -1.52 
Philippines 2178.844683 6263.9232717 6.41 
India 1711.1651614 35969.07528 20.97 
Turkey 9035.9132087 17182.470971 3.85 
China 9653.5109856 212182.44246 19.93 
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New Zealand 19.710724668 142.44130871 12.34 
Russia 369.39297734 11927.501871 22.68 
Korea 19259.316117 20039.270887 0.23 
Israel 786.231704 1361.0379525 3.28 
AUSTRALASIAN 
Australia 780.04101778 890.21761192 0.78 
EUROPE 
Norway 2153.0054632 3128.3623498 2.22 
Switzerland 5481.17354 7288.1231953 1.69 
Ice land 153.46424787 222.30802092 2.20 
European Union (28 Countries) 87824.861824 99735.092058 0.75 
NORTH AMERICA 
Mexico 7604.6223222 4194.500000 -3.44 
Canada 4335.3820311 4777.1896215 0.57 
United States of America 50880.500624 33277.271943 -2.47 
Costa Rica 187.62505661 535.52379232 6.36 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Chile 562.3029226 359.9737062 -2.59 
Brazil 2727.5682198 7362.2856907 6.01 
Colombia 2342.3570188 3297.0799012 2.03 
OECD Member Countries 242964.28604 228052.49612 -0.37 
Source: OECD Data, Accessed on 29 September, 2017 
 
Government Protection of Farmer and Consumer 
 The Producer and Consumer support estimates, their percentages, 
Nominal Protection Coefficients, Nominal Assistance Coefficients of the 
various countries, continent wise are given in the Table 11. The growth rates 
have been calculated from 1995-97 to 2014-16. South Africa being a 
capitalistic democracy protects neither the producer nor the consumer. 
However, the producer support estimates growth rate is higher than the 
consumer support estimates growth rate in South Africa. In case of capitalistic 
Australasian countries, the welfare state New Zealand under monarchy 
supports both the producers and the consumers with PSE growth rates of 
4.34% and CSE growth rates of 6.53%. Australia being a constitutional 
monarchy supports the producers over the consumers with growth rates of -
1.87% for PSE and -100% for CSE. Among the Asian countries Korea, China, 
Indonesia and Vietnam support the consumers over the producers. Whereas, 
Kazakhstan, Turkey, Israel and Japan supports the producers over the 
consumers. In the European nations, Iceland, Norway and Russia support the 
consumers over the producers in contrast to the Switzerland’s and Ukraine’s 
way of support. In North and South America only the large economies such as 
Canada, the USA and Brazil support the consumers over the producers. 
Basically the political economy of protecting producer and consumer depends 
upon their share of votes in elections. Capitalistic countries protect more 
producer compared to consumer, contrastingly, socialist or mixed economies 
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protect more consumer because of political benefits in elections. (Consumers 
100% votes). 
 
 
Support to producers and consumers 
 In general, when the governments support the producer, there is rise in 
inflation and the consumer is affected with price rise which in turn reflects as 
less economic growth at national level. On an international level, international 
prices of commodities fall down, trade is effected and world growth slows 
down. Reasons for supporting producer could be farmers lobby and votes in 
elections. Protection of producers beyond the specified limits is also against 
the WTO-AOA. For the period of 2014-2016, the countries such as South 
Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Israel, Turkey, China, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Vietnam, European Union, Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland, Russia, Canada, the USA, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Brazil, Colombia, and OECD show Producer Support Estimates to be higher 
than the Consumer Support Estimates. 
 When the governments support the consumer, the producer is 
adversely affected. However, the economic growth improves accompanied by 
more trade and easy market access resulting in more taxes. Also, the 
international trade improves and WTO AOA would be satisfied. This scenario 
could be observed only in the case of Ukraine for the years 1995-97 and 2014-
16. Predominantly, in developed nations, producers are more supported in 
contrast to the developing countries, where consumers are more protected. The 
tax burden on the consumer increases with the support to the producer. The 
regulating agencies such as the hierarchical bureaucracy avoid budget deficits. 
Ministry of Agriculture protects off-budget programs like tariffs and quotas 
which affects access of export markets. Intervention of governments in the 
agriculture sector, is a necessity as it is not a profitable business. Also, 
governments in various countries have been protecting agriculture since ages. 
In fact, developed countries protect more agriculture. Inflation tackling is a 
problem for poverty – ridden countries, which puts an obligation to protect the 
consumer. 
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Table 11. Producer and Consumer support estimates with growth rates 
Producer Support Estimate by country  
 
Consumer Support Estimate by country  
Continent/Cou
ntry 
198
6-88 
1995
-97 
2014
-16 
Grow
th 
Rate 
(%) 
  Continent/Cou
ntry 
1986
-88 
1995
-97 
2014
-16 
Grow
th 
Rate 
(%) 
AFRICA    AFRICA  
South Africa1    South Africa1  
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 970 585 -2.50 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -965 -402 -4.28 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 10.6 3.2  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -11.3 -2.3  
Producer 
NAC (coeff.) 
 .. 1.12 1.03  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.13 1.02  
AUSTRALASIAN    AUSTRALASIAN   
Australia    Australia  
PSE (million 
USD) 
150
6 
1282 879 -1.87 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-600 -267 0 -
100.0
0 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
10.3 5.8 1.9  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-11.7 -3.4 0.0  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.08 1.03 1.00  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.13 1.04 1.00  
New Zealand    New Zealand   
PSE (million 
USD) 
429 53 124 4.34 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-53 -24 -85 6.53 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
10.3 0.8 0.8  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-5.6 -1.6 -3.1  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.02 1.00 1.01  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.06 1.02 1.03  
ASIA    ASIA   
Japan    Japan  
PSE (million 
USD) 
497
57 
5889
1 
3981
7 
-1.94 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
6128
4 
-
7619
9 
-
4559
5 
-2.54 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
64.0 58.2 47.0  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-62.3 -53.7 -39.9  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
2.65 2.30 1.75  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
2.65 2.16 1.66  
Korea    Korea   
PSE (million 
USD) 
120
40 
2308
0 
2068
8 
-0.55 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
1178
6 
-
2377
7 
-
2185
7 
-0.42 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
70.0 66.9 49.3  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-65.9 -64.9 -45.2  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
3.31 2.91 1.89  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
2.94 2.87 1.83  
Israel1,3    Israel1,3   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 810 1 269 2.27 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -722 -955 1.41 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 20.7 15.7  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -19.6 -11.5  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.19 1.13  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.25 1.13  
Turkey    Turkey   
PSE (million 
USD) 
432
6 
8079 1715
9 
3.84 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
3125 
-
5552 
-
1068
5 
3.33 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
22.8 29.0 26.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-22.8 -25.4 -22.3  
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Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.23 1.28 1.31  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.30 1.35 1.29  
China1    China1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 6667 215 
271 
18.97 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
2205 
-
1602
40 
23.90 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 2.7 14.9  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -0.9 -11.3  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.00 1.13  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.01 1.14  
Indonesia1,6    Indonesia1,6   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 1330 3166
5 
17.18 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
1162 
-
3254
8 
18.13 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 3.5 24.9  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -3.2 -30.2  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.03 1.32  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.03 1.47  
Kazakhstan1    Kazakhstan1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 274 893 6.09 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -356 233 -
198.0
0 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 6.7 5.0  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -9.7 3.9  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.06 0.97  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.10 0.98  
Philippines7    Philippines7   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 2011 7593 6.87 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
2109 
-
7940 
6.85 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 20.5 24.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -21.2 -25.0  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.29 1.33  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.30 1.35  
Viet Nam7    Viet Nam7   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 518 -992 -
203.1
4 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -605 -
1746 
5.44 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 5.9 -2.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -8.0 -4.9  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.07 0.99  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.09 1.07  
EUROPE  
 
EUROPE  
European Union2    European Union2   
PSE (million 
USD) 
973
79 
1169
53 
1018
19 
-0.69 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
7247
5 
-
5835
1 
-
2156
3 
-4.86 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
39.2 33.8 19.6  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-35.7 -20.8 -4.7  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.69 1.33 1.05  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.69 1.30 1.05  
Iceland    Iceland   
PSE (million 
USD) 
193 131 204 2.24 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-112 -59 -103 2.83 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
77.2 60.4 55.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-70.4 -42.9 -43.2  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
4.16 2.32 1.98  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
4.38 1.82 1.77  
Norway    Norway   
PSE (million 
USD) 
280
1 
2910 3456 0.86 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
1333 
-
1261 
-
1712 
1.54 
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Percentage 
PSE (%) 
70.4 66.3 59.7  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-55.8 -47.4 -42.5  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
4.06 2.50 1.91  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
3.22 2.12 1.83  
Switzerland    Switzerland   
PSE (million 
USD) 
673
9 
7175 7272 0.07 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
6459 
-
5763 
-
4172 
-1.60 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
75.6 65.1 57.7  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-74.3 -60.8 -40.4  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
4.21 2.69 1.68  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
4.49 2.91 1.69  
Russia1    Russia1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 6522 1126
2 
2.77 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
1561 
-
9720 
9.58 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 19.6 13.9  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -5.4 -12.0  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.07 1.10  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.05 1.14  
Ukraine1    Ukraine1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
1169 
-
2552 
3.98 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 1950 2302 0.83 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. -7.5 -8.6  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. 19.6 13.6  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 0.87 0.88  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 0.82 0.86  
NORTH AMERICA    NORTH AMERICA   
Canada    Canada  
PSE (million 
USD) 
613
6 
3524 4424 1.14 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
2860 
-
1758 
-
2968 
2.65 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
36.1 16.1 9.3  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-22.7 -11.2 -10.0  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.38 1.10 1.06  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.33 1.13 1.11  
United States    United States   
PSE (million 
USD) 
353
37 
2561
7 
3841
3 
2.05 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
2630 
6157 2964
8 
8.18 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
21.2 11.9 9.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-2.4 4.3 11.6  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.12 1.06 1.03  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.12 1.08 1.04  
Mexico4    Mexico4   
PSE (million 
USD) 
843
7 
1645 5694 6.41 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
6363 
234 -339 -
201.7
8 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
28.5 6.9 9.8  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-24.5 0.4 -0.6  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.34 1.01 1.02  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.38 1.02 1.02  
Costa Rica1    Costa Rica1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 88 501 9.09 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -87 -467 8.77 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 3.9 10.0  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -8.0 -17.8  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.04 1.11  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.09 1.22  
SOUTH AMERICA    SOUTH AMERICA   
Chile1    Chile1  
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 390 393 0.04 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -392 -32 -11.77 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 7.5 3.0  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -7.6 -0.3  
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Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.07 1.00  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.08 1.00  
Brazil1    Brazil1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
6826 
6221 -
199.5
6 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 6442 -166 -
184.0
1 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. -14.4 3.8  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. 12.3 -0.3  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 0.82 1.01  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 0.89 1.02  
Colombia1    Colombia1   
PSE (million 
USD) 
 .. 3451 4112 0.88 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
 .. -
3207 
-
3392 
0.28 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
 .. 24.0 15.5  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
 .. -30.3 -15.4  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.30 1.13  
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
 .. 1.44 1.18  
OECD5    OECD5   
PSE (million 
USD) 
217 
205 
2505
39 
2348
29 
-0.32 
 
CSE (million 
USD) 
-
1618
26 
-
1677
35 
-
7886
3 
-3.70 
Percentage 
PSE (%) 
36.5 30.4 18.2  
 
Percentage 
CSE (%) 
-33.2 -24.2 -7.6  
Producer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.51 1.31 1.10   
 
Consumer NPC 
(coeff.) 
1.59 1.37 1.13  
Note: p: provisional. NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient. NAC: Nominal Assistance 
Coefficient. 1.   Data are presented from 1995 onwards. 2.   EU12 for 1986-88; EU15 for 
1995-97; and EU28 from 2014 when available. 3.   The statistical data for Israel are supplied 
by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the 
OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. 4.   For Mexico, the 
period 1986-88 is replaced by 1991-93. 5.   OECD EU countries are included individually in 
the OECD total for all years prior to their accession to the EU except Latvia, for which data 
is not available. Slovenia is only included from 1992. The OECD total does not include the 
non-OECD EU member states. 6.   For Indonesia, the period 2014-16 is replaced by 2013-
15. 7.   For Philippines and Viet Nam, the period 1995-97 is replaced by 2000-02. Data are 
presented from 2000 onwards. 
Source: OECD (2017), “Producer and Consumer Support Estimates”, OECD Agriculture 
statistics (database).  
 
 The Producer support estimates percentages of the various countries 
are given in the Figure 1. The trend line is drawn with the base-line of 1986-
88. 
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 The Contribution of Budgetary Payments to change in Producer 
Support Estimate by country, 2015 to 2016 is given in Table 12. Most of the 
developed economies such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan the EU, Iceland, 
Switzerland, Norway and Canada; some of the developing economies such as 
Turkey, Vietnam, Russia and Brazil; and the OECD Countries have positive 
change towards the contribution of budgetary Payments to change in Producer 
Support Estimate by country, 2015 to 2016. 
Table 12. Contribution of Budgetary Payments to change in Producer Support Estimate by 
country, 2015 to 2016 
Country 
Producer 
Support 
Estimate 
(PSE) 
% change in PSE, contribution of Budgetary Payments, all other variables held constant 
% 
change 
Total 
Payments based on: 
Output 
Input 
use 
Current 
A/An/R/I, 
production 
required 
Non-
current 
A/An/R/I, 
production 
required 
Non-
current 
A/An/R/I, 
production 
not 
required 
Non-
commodity 
criteria 
Miscellaneous 
payments 
AFRICA 
South Africa -44.1 -0.6 0.0 1.6 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AUSTRALASIAN 
Australia 14.7 14.7 0.0 7.8 3.3 0.0 4.4 0.0 -0.9 
New Zealand 49.7 3.6 0.0 2.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ASIA 
Israel  (2) -3.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Japan 6.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.4 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Korea -1.4 2.6 0.0 0.2 2.4 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey 10.2 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
China -1.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Viet Nam 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kazakhstan -136.2 7.8 2.6 8.2 -3.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Philippines -16.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Indonesia  (4)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
EUROPE 
European 
Union  (1) 
6.6 2.8 -0.1 -2.8 7.3 -0.1 -1.7 0.0 0.1 
Iceland 2.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Switzerland 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.3 
Norway -0.3 -0.7 0.6 0.2 -1.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ukraine -47.0 -15.9 0.0 -15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russia 43.1 -8.5 0.6 -6.2 -1.3 0.0 0.0 -1.6 0.0 
NORTH AMERICA 
Costa Rica -3.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 
Mexico -19.2 -4.2 -0.3 -3.8 1.7 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United States -12.8 -2.5 -0.2 -1.3 -0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.5 
Canada 25.9 11.9 0.0 -0.5 12.5 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Brazil 105.2 5.2 0.4 4.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chile -7.1 -6.6 0.0 -0.0 -6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Colombia -1.3 -8.7 -1.5 -7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OECD  (3) 2.2 1.5 -0.0 -1.4 3.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.0 
1. 28 member countries. 
2. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the 
responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the 
OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem 
and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. 
3. Average of % changes in PSE in OECD countries (in national 
currency) weighted by the shares of national PSEs within the PSE of the 
OECD of the previous year; not equivalent to the change in OECD PSE 
expressed in a common currency. 
4. 2016 data are not available and hence no decomposition could be 
made.    
Source: OECD (2017), “Producer and Consumer Support Estimates”, OECD Agriculture 
statistics (database).  
 
Conclusion 
 International political economy studies problems that arise from or are 
affected by the interaction of international politics, international economics, 
and different social systemsThe study focused on the incentives and strategies 
of politicians, economists, agency officials, and environmental advocates and 
how this web of interactions affects agricultural and food policies, farmers, 
consumer, welfare and economic growth. It was found that most of the 
developed countries are capitalistic and developing countries are socialistic. 
Only few countries which are communist. But majority of the countries in the 
world are mixed economies in operation. These type of economies play an 
important role in resource allocation and protection of agriculture.  
 The real GDP (%) is either increasing or follows a mixed trend in case 
of developed countries in contrast to the developing countries decreasing 
trend. However, the decreasing trend of developing countries real GDP (%) 
will not enable them to allocate more on agriculture. All the G7 advanced 
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economies, 30 emerging and developing Asian economies, only 4 countries 
(China, India, Indonesia and Thailand), among the Middle Eastern countries, 
North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
major economies with at least 0.5% of Global GDP. And in 45 Sub-Saharan 
African Countries only Nigeria has at least 0.5% of Global GDP. It shows that 
Africa is the highest backward continent in the world. Countries which have 
less than 0.5% of Global GDP has a disadvantage in budget allocation to 
agriculture. Nigeria has the maximum (17.8%) share of GDP to Agriculture, 
followed by India (17.2 %). The UK (0.7%), Belgium (0.7%), Germany 
(0.8%) and the UAE (0.8%) have the least share of agriculture sector 
contribution to their GDP’s. And the economies of the US and France have 
almost service sector share of nearly 80%. 
 Government investments may be assigned priorities according to their 
cost-benefit ratios. High dependence on agriculture is observed in most of the 
developing countries and the high income economies are focusing more on 
(>50%) service sector. Saudi Arabia and the UAE has high industry sector 
share (>50%) which is due to their exploration of oil and petroleum reserves. 
The more dependence on agriculture will allow the politicians to exploit in the 
elections. The political economy of AOI indicates that the countries which 
have more than 1 will spend more budget in budget allocation towards 
agriculture. It was found that most of the countries AOI is less than 1, which 
depicts that, clearly agriculture globally is not on the priority list for the local 
central governments, except for South Korea and Switzerland, whose 
agriculture orientation index is greater than 1(1.96 and 5.08 respectively). 
 International institutions Governments like World Bank has been 
giving low to medium preference to funding in Agriculture, Fishing and 
Forestry, among various sectors. This shows that poor treatment towards the 
agriculture sector. The study observed that Middle East and North African 
Countries are funded extremely low in comparison to other regions of the 
world by IDA and IBRD. This could be due to the political instability and 
terrorism, which hinders the growth of the regions. The sudden increase of 
funds to Argentina and decreased funding for the countries Nigeria, India, 
Mexico and Brazil was found. 
 The numerical targets established by the URAA are not followed in 
many WTO member countries which have comparative advantage. During the 
period 2000 to 2016, Russia, India, China and New Zealand are given more 
domestic support and Mexico, Chile, USA, Japan and OECD countries were 
given decreasing support to agricultural sector than compared to other WTO 
member countries. Among the Asian countries Korea, China, Indonesia and 
Vietnam support the consumers over the producers. Whereas, Kazakhstan, 
Turkey, Israel and Japan supports the producers over the consumers. In the 
European nations, Iceland, Norway and Russia support the consumers over the 
European Scientific Journal February 2018 edition Vol.14, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
218 
producers in contrast to the Switzerland’s and Ukraine’s way of support. In 
North and South America only the large economies such as Canada, the USA 
and Brazil support the consumers over the producers. 
  The political economy of protecting producer and consumer depends 
upon their share of votes in elections. Capitalistic countries protect more 
producer compared to consumer, contrastingly, socialist or mixed economies 
protect more consumer because of political benefits in elections. Globally, 
political and economic systems, international governments like World Bank, 
Trade organizations and WTO’s attitude towards agriculture is poor. Hence, 
agriculture must be brought on the global political agenda for the sustainable 
food security, economic development and to achieve Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG’s). The protection of producers and consumers is 
being based on the political will of the governments. The study suggests that, 
economic minded politicians and political minded economists who has 
knowledge of social, political and economic systems are required in efficient 
economic system of agriculture.  
 Acknowledgements: SERB, Ministry of Science and Technology, 
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APPENDIX I 
Countries and their economies 
N
o. 
Country/Eco
nomy 
Features 
 
AFRICA 
1  Nigeria Anocracy, Aristocracy, Banana Republic, Common Wealth, 
Democracy, Dictatorship, Emirate, Federal Republic, Kleptocracy, 
Parliamentary Republic.  
ASIA 
1  Indonesia Asymmetrical Federation, Bureaucracy, Colony, Democracy, 
Federal Republic, Kleptocracy, Parliamentary Republic, 
Presidential Democracy, Republic, Unitary state. 
2  Iran Authoritarian, Autocracy, Gerontocracy, Islamic Republic. 
3  Saudi Arabia Absolute Monarchy, Authoritarian, Autocracy, Emirate, 
Kleptocracy, Monarchy, Unitary State, Welfare State. 
4  Turkey Authoritarian, Parliamentary Democracy, Parliamentary Republic, 
Republic, Unitary State.  
EUROPE 
1  Russia Anocracy, Asymmetrical Federation, Authoritarian, 
Corporatocracy, Dictatorship, Elective Monarchy, Federalism, 
Feudalism, Kleptocracy, Leninism, Marxism, Noocracy, Oligarchy, 
Parliamentary Republic, Provisional Government, Republic, 
Socialist Republic, Stratocracy, Technocracy.  
2  Poland Alliance, Authoritarian, Democracy, Parliamentary Democracy, 
People's Republic, Unitary State.  
SOUTH AMERICA 
1  Colombia Democracy, Federal Republic, Unitary State. 
2  Argentina Bureaucracy, Colony, Democracy, Dictatorship, Federal Republic, 
Federalism, Liberal Democracy, Republic, Stratocracy. 
3  Venezuela Authoritarian, Despotism, Federal Republic, Federalism, Oligarchy, 
Republic. 
4  Brazil Colony, Democracy, Federal Republic, Federalism, Liberal 
Democracy, Parliamentary Republic, Republic. 
 
 
